Regulation and Corporate Board Composition by Staubo, Siv
This file was downloaded from BI Brage,  
the institutional repository (open access) at BI Norwegian Business School 
http://brage.bibsys.no/bi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Series of Dissertations 1/2014 
BI Norwegian Business School 
 
 
Siv Staubo 
 
Regulation and Corporate Board Composition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The papers of this dissertation (pages 15-134) are not available in BI Brage, due to copyright 
matters: 
 
 
• Article  1:  
Does mandatory gender balance work? Changing organizational form to avoid board 
upheaval 
Authors: Øyvind Bøhren and Siv Staubo 
 
• Article 2:  
Female directors and board independence: Evidence from boards with mandatory gender 
balance 
Authors: Øyvind Bøhren and Siv Staubo 
 
• Article 3:  
Determinants of board independence in a free contracting environment 
Authors: Siv Staubo 
 
 
A complete version of the dissertation (print copy) may be ordered from BI’s website: 
http://www.bi.edu/research/Research-Publications 
 
  
 
 
 
Regulation and Corporate Board 
Composition 
 
 
Siv Staubo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A dissertation submitted to BI Norwegian Business School  
for the degree of PhD 
 
 
 
PhD specialisation: Financial Economics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Series of Dissertations 1/2014 
 
BI Norwegian Business School 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Siv Staubo 
Regulation and Corporate Board Composition 
 
 
 
 
© Siv Staubo 
2014 
 
 
Series of Dissertations 1/2014 
 
ISBN: 978-82-8247-084-1 
ISSN: 1502-2099 
 
 
 
BI Norwegian Business School 
N-0442 Oslo 
Phone: +47 4641 0000 
 
 
 
Printing: Allkopi 
 
 
 
The dissertation may be ordered from our website:  
www.bi.no/en/Research/Research-Publications/ 
 
 
  
3 
 
Acknowledgements 
First of all, I would like to thank Øyvind Bøhren, my supervisor, for his guidance, advice, and 
patience throughout my time as a PhD student. His input has been invaluable for the 
completion of this dissertation. Next, I am grateful to the former (Dag Michalsen) and the 
present (Richard Priestley) Head of Department of Financial Economics, for making it 
possible to combine my work in the Department with PhD studies. I thank Øystein Strøm and 
Charlotte Østergaard for valuable comments and suggestions at my pre-doc defense. I 
appreciate valuable comments from my colleagues at BI, particularly from Janis Berzins, 
Bogdan Stacescu, and Øyvind Norli. Encouraging and enjoyable chats with Siri Valseth, Kjell 
Jørgensen, and Andreea Mitrache have been of great importance throughout these years. 
Finally, I want to thank my wonderful family and my good friends for their support.  
  
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
5 
 
Contents         
1  Introduction              9 
 
1.1 Does mandatory gender balance work?      
      Changing organizational form to avoid board upheaval.      11 
1.2 Female directors and board independence: 
       Evidence from boards with mandatory gender balance.      11 
1.3  Determinants of board independence in a free contracting environment.          12 
 
 
Article 1 
Does mandatory gender balance work? Changing organizational form  
to avoid board upheaval             15
     
1  Introduction           18 
 
 2  Predictions             24 
2.1 Compliance costs          25 
2.2 Compliance benefits          26 
2.3 Benefits regardless of the GBL         27 
 
3  Data and descriptive statistics        28 
 
4  Statistical tests          32 
4.1 The base case           34 
4.2 Robustness           37 
4.3 Entry          43 
 
5  Summary and conclusions           47 
 
 
Article 2 
Female directors and board independence: Evidence from boards    
with mandatory gender balance        55 
 
1  Introduction          58 
 
2  Predictions           63 
2.1 Board independence        65 
2.2 Regulatory determinants        67 
2.3 Non-regulatory determinants       68 
 
3  Data and summary statistics         69 
 
4  Empirical methodology and base-case results      79 
 
5  Robustness           82 
5.1 Econometric techniques        82 
6 
 
5.2 Board independence         84 
5.3 Non-regulatory determinants of board independence     86 
 
6  Conclusions           89 
 
Article 3 
Determinants of board independence in a free contracting environment.   95 
1  Introduction            98 
2  Theory and predictions         102  
2.1 Measures of board independence       104 
2.2 Determinants of board independence      105 
 3  Data, sample, and summary statistics       107 
4   Research design, methodology, and estimation results     115 
5  Robustness           123 
 5.1    Alternative econometric techniques      123 
 5.2    Alternative proxy for board independence     128 
 5.3    Non-linear determinants of board independence    130 
6  Conclusion           132 
       
Summary           141 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
7 
 
Figures, tables, and appendices 
Article 1 
Does mandatory gender balance work? Changing organizational form to  
avoid board upheaval         15 
 
Tables 
1. Responding to the gender balance law by choosing organizational form  19 
2. Sample size by listing status, exit behavior, and entry behavior                 29 
3. Characteristics of exit firms and non-exit firms        31 
4. Exit propensity in Norway and in neighboring countries      33 
5. The base-case estimates        36 
6. Alternative estimation methods          38 
7. Alternative definitions of family control          40 
8. Definition of exit status             42 
9. The entry decision             45   
  
Appendices 
1. Regulatory differences between limited liability firms  
    with alternative organizational forms      51 
2. Regulation of gender balance in corporate boards across the world  52 
3. The empirical variables           53   
  
 
Article 2 
Female directors and board independence:  Evidence from boards with  
mandatory gender balance            55 
 
Figures 
1. The fraction of female directors in Norwegian firms exposed to the   
            gender balance law                  58 
      
Tables 
1. The empirical proxies        64 
2. Distributional properties of key variables            70 
3. Characteristics of listed and non-listed firms       71 
4. Director types          73 
5. Board size               75 
6. Multiple directorships             76 
7. Bivariate correlation coefficients between the determinants  
of board independence             78 
8. Estimates of the base-case model            80 
9. Alternative econometric techniques           83 
10. Alternative proxies for board independence          85 
11. Alternative non-regulatory determinants of board independence      88 
 
Appendices 
1. Classifying directors as inside, grey or outside: Examples         93 
8 
 
Article 3 
Determinants of board independence in a free contracting environment    95 
 
Tables 
1. The empirical variables        103 
2. Distributional properties of the variables             109 
3. Firm characteristics by ownership        111 
4. Bivariate correlation coefficients between the determinants  
  of board independence        114 
5. Estimates of the base-case model – Agency problem 1      116 
6. Estimates of the base-case model – Agency problem 2      119 
7. Estimates of the base-case model in subsamples      121 
8. Alternative estimation methods – Agency problem 1     124 
9. Alternative estimation methods – Agency problem 2     126 
10. Alternative proxy for board independence – Agency problem 1          129 
11. Estimates of the base-case model with non-linear determinants    
   – Agency problem 1          131 
 
Appendices 
1. Characteristics of non-listed firms and listed firms       138 
2. Properties of the instrumental variable (IV)         139 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
9 
 
1. Introduction 
This thesis consists of three essays investigating the effects of regulations on board 
composition. Two regulations affecting the selection of board members have been put into 
effect during the last decade: 
Regulation 1: The Gender Balance Law (GBL). In 2003, the Norwegian government passed a 
law requiring at least  40% of each gender  in the board of directors of ASA firms. 
Regulation 2: The Independence Code (IC). In 2006, boards of listed ASA firms were 
recommended by a corporate governance code from the Oslo Stock Exchange to appoint at 
least 50% independent directors to their boards.  
The GBL is unique to Norway. Although ‘women on boards’ is a hot topic in countries across 
the world, Norway is the first country to establish a 40% gender quota by law. Firms that do 
not comply with the law will be liquidated.  
The IC is a recommendation, following the principle of comply-or-explain. This 
recommendation is one of the codes in ‘The Norwegian code of practice for Corporate 
Governance’. Similar codes exist in most countries across the world. An independent director 
is neither a member of the firm’s management team nor family-related to members of the 
management team. A more detailed definition of independent directors is given in the second 
essay. 
This thesis is in the field of corporate governance. The corporate governance structure 
involves laws, rules, and regulations on the distribution of rights and responsibilities among 
the different stakeholders in the firm. Due to several financial crises in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, there has been an increased interest in the regulation of corporate governance. In 
particular, the composition of the corporate board has achieved extensive attention.   
The first essay in the thesis investigates stockholders’ reactions to the GBL. 
The second essay mainly addresses a supposedly unintended consequence of the GBL. 
Furthermore, this essay explores the link between the GBL and the IC.  
Finally, using a sample of firms that are neither exposed to the GBL nor the IC, the third 
essay explores which firms will benefit and which firms will suffer if they had to comply with 
one of these regulations/recommendations or both. 
The motivation for writing three essays on the regulation of board composition is that such 
regulations come with both costs and benefits. Therefore, regulation might be costly to some 
firms and beneficial to others. This possibility is analyzed in detail in the three essays. If we 
assume that stockholders are able to compose an optimal board for their firm, restrictions to 
board composition might result in non-optimal boards for some firms. This happens if a 
10 
 
regulation makes it costly for stockholders to compose a board with the same qualities as the 
board had before the firm was exposed to the regulation. 
To better understand why the GBL and the IC might have both costs and benefits, we explain 
the background of the two regulations. 
The GBL, was proposed by a politician who believed that more value for stockholders can be 
created by increasing diversity in top management and on corporate boards. Other politicians 
argue that it makes a fairer society when firms include more women in their board room. For 
example, Prime Minister David Cameron recently stated that: “There is clear evidence that 
ending Britain’s male-dominated business culture would improve performance, and that 
Britain’s economic recovery is being held back by a lack of women in the boardroom” (The 
Guardian 2012).  
The IC was first proposed in the United States, and later included in the Sarbane-Oxeley Act 
(SOX). Prior to SOX, boards in United States, as well as in most other countries, were 
dominated by insiders who were members of the management team. During the last decade, 
most countries have developed corporate governance codes that recommend stockholders to 
appoint a majority of independent directors. Following several financial scandals, policy 
makers suggested that enhancing the boards’ monitoring role would help prevent further 
scandals. Independent directors are assumed to be better at monitoring management than 
dependent directors. To illustrate, the European Commission’s Recommendation from 
October 6, 2006 states the following: ‘The role of independent non-executive directors 
features prominently in corporate governance codes. The presence of independent 
representatives on the board, capable of challenging the decisions of management, is widely 
considered a means of protecting the interests of stockholders and, where appropriate, other 
stakeholders.’  
We believe that the corporate governance rationale for these opinions need to be further 
investigated. As far as we can judge, existing research provides no robust support for these 
opinions. That is, there is neither convincing theory nor convincing empirical evidence 
showing that more board independence unconditionally improves firm value. The reason is 
simply that more board independence has both benefits and costs and that the costs may 
outweigh the benefits.  Moreover, this relationship between costs and benefits may vary from 
firm to firm. 
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1.1 Does mandatory gender balance work? Changing organizational form 
to avoid board upheaval 
In the first essay, we study stockholders’ reactions to the gender balance law (GBL). We find 
that, after the GBL ruled that the firm will be liquidated unless at least 40% of each gender is 
present on the board, half the firms exited to an organizational form that is not exposed to the 
law. In Norway, as in many other countries, there are two organizational forms for limited 
liability firms. All firms operating in the most advanced organizational form (ASA) had to 
change their boards by 2008. The only way to avoid the GBL was to exit to a less advanced 
organizational form (AS), where gender diversity in the boardroom is not regulated. It is 
reasonable to infer that the new regulation is costly to many firms, since the stockholders of 
half the firms decided to exit the exposed organizational form.  
We also show that the costs are firm-specific. Exit is more common when the firm is non-
listed, successful, small, young, has powerful owners, no dominating family owner, and few 
female directors. It is important to notice that listed firms have to delist if they change 
organizational form. That is, all listed firms have to operate in the most advanced 
organizational form. Consequently, if the benefits of being listed are greater than the costs of 
changing the board, the GBL is still costly even though the firm does not exit. 
Correspondingly, certain unexposed firms may hesitate to become exposed because the 
expected benefits of operating in the most advanced organizational form are lower than the 
cost of changing the board.   
Overall, we find that mandatory gender balance may produce firms with either inefficient 
boards or inefficient organizational forms. 
1.2 Female directors and board independence: Evidence from boards with 
mandatory gender balance 
The second essay explores whether gender quotas have other effects on the composition of 
corporate boards than the implied upward shift in gender diversity. We analyze the impact on 
board independence of the GBL that requires at least 40 percent of a firm’s directors to be of 
each gender. We find that the average fraction of independent directors grows by 20 
percentage points after the passage of the law. This upwards shift occurs because 84 percent 
of the female directors are independent, while only 50 percent of the men are.  
This large increase in board independence may be costly to some firms because the demand 
for monitoring by independent directors is firm-specific. That is, optimal board independence 
requires a trade-off between monitoring by independent directors and advice by dependent 
directors. This conflict between monitoring and advice suggests that board quality will suffer 
if forced gender balance pushes the board’s independence level above its optimal level.  
12 
 
We find that demand for an independent board is lowest in small, young, profitable, non-
listed firms with few female directors and powerful stockholders. Such firms need monitoring 
by independent directors the least and advice by dependent directors the most. These firms are 
hit hardest by excessive board independence, which may be an unintended side effect of 
mandatory gender balance.  
One may wonder whether increased board independence is driven not by the GBL, but rather 
by the IC, which was introduced in the middle of our sample period. This code is soft law 
based on the principle of comply-or-explain, recommending that half the firm’s directors be 
independent. However, the code applies to the listed (public) firms, but not to the non-listed 
(private). Hence, whereas the GBL imposes the same indirect restriction on board 
independence regardless of listing status, the IC restricts board independence only in listed 
firms. We exploit this difference to separate the effects on independence stemming from the 
two regulations. Roughly, half the firms in the population are listed and implicitly exposed to 
both the GBL and the code. The other half consists of non-listed firms and is exposed only to 
the GBL. Therefore, the smaller the difference in growth of board independence between 
listed and non-listed firms, the higher the likelihood that the regulatory effect on 
independence is due to the GBL rather than the IC.  
Our evidence shows that the impact does not come from the IC, but rather from the GBL. The 
GBL produces the same upward shift in board independence regardless of the firm’s listing 
status. That is, because the entire pool of female director talent has so few dependent 
candidates, one cannot select both many women and many dependent women simultaneously. 
Therefore, choosing a female director very often means having to choose an independent 
director, even though that was not the intention.  
1.3 Determinants of board independence in a free contracting environment 
The essay is the first to explore the demand for monitoring and advice on the board by the 
owners of firms that are not required by regulation to appoint independent directors. The 
sample of firms in this study is regulated neither by the GBL nor by the IC. Our focus is on 
the potential conflict between monitoring and advice and on the idea that the relative value of 
these two board functions varies across firms.  
We explore the board’s monitoring role not just relative to the CEO, but also relative to 
potential conflicts between large and small stockholders. The first of these two monitoring 
functions is the only focus in the existing literature. This function of the board is to reduce the 
principal-agent problem that arises when managers exploit their control rights at the 
stockholders’ expense. This situation is called the first agency problem in the literature, and 
directors who are independent of management are supposed to be better at reducing this 
problem.  
13 
 
The board’s second monitoring function is to oversee the conflict between majority and 
minority stockholders, which has been called the second agency problem. Directors who are 
independent of influential stockholders are supposed to be better at protecting the rights of 
minority stockholders. As far as we are aware, we are the first to study the second monitoring 
function in a board independence setting.  
Our evidence shows that well established, small, and profitable firms with concentrated 
ownership need advice from dependent directors more than monitoring of their management 
by independent directors. The analysis shows similar results when we investigate the demand 
for board independence driven by potential conflicts between large and small stockholders. 
Unlike earlier research, we find that female directors are just as likely to be advisors as 
monitors when the firm operates in a free contracting environment regarding gender balance 
and independence. Our results support the idea that optimal board independence is firm-
specific. 
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Appendix 1: Characteristics of non-listed firms and listed firms
Variable Mean Median Mean Median
Board characteristics
Board independence - A1 0.48 0.00 0.92 1.00
Board independence - A2 0.57 0.67 0.93 1.00
Board size 3.80 3.00 6.20 6.00
Female directors 0.15 0.00 0.21 0.20
BoD tenure 3.47 3.00 1.62 1.37
Ownership characteristics
Outside concentration 0.21 0.20 0.16 0.10
Inside ownership 78.30 93.00 0.12 0.00
CEO ownership 37.30 33.33 0.10 8.33
Largest owner 45.79 49.00 26.61 22.64
Family ownership 82.98 99.95 20.53 14.20
Family characteristics
Family control 0.82 1.00 0.08 0.00
Family chair 0.43 0.00 0.12 0.00
Family CEO 0.45 0.00 0.08 0.00
Family board 0.45 0.00 0.07 0.00
General firm characteristics
Performance 8.48 3.42 5.59 5.02
Leverage 0.74 0.76 0.49 0.52
Growth 1.26 1.03 1.15 1.08
Information costs 8.58 5.09 7.35 4.96
Firm age 12.28 9.00 34.61 18.00
Firm size 28.06 8.20 885.84 85.58
CEO tenure 6.12 5.00 5.09 4.00
CEO age 46.64 46.00 47.12 47.00
N 178,721 178,721 3,427 3,427
Non-listed firms Listed firms
This table shows the mean and median values of the variables used to measure board, ownership, 
family, and general firm characteristics. Table 1 defines the variables.  The sample is Norwegian 
non-listed and listed firms, from 2000–2011, where revenue ≥ 2 million NOK, board size ≥ 3, and 
the largest owner holds < 90% of the equity. Performance is censored at 2% and 98% and 
leverage is censored at 99%.   
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Appendix 2: Properties of the instrumental variable (IV)             
                      
Panel A: CEO ownership classified by CEO age               
Variable   All   Young CEO   Old CEO   Difference   p-value 
CEO ownership 37.30   36.16   38.49   -2.33   (0.000) 
                      
Panel B: Board and firm characteristics classified by CEO age             
Variable   All   Young CEO   Old CEO   Difference   p-value 
Board independence-A1 0.48   0.48   0.48   0.00   (1.000) 
Board independence-A2 0.57   0.58   0.56   0.02   (0.000) 
Performance   8.48   8.62   8.27   0.35   (0.000) 
Leverage   0.74   0.76   0.71   0.05   (0.000) 
Female directors   0.15   0.15   0.16   -0.01   (0.000) 
Firm size   16.18   16.13   16.28   -0.15   (0.000) 
This table shows board and firm characteristics for young and old CEOs. A young CEO is a CEO that is younger than 47 years (the 
average age of CEOs in our sample), an old CEO is a CEO that is 47 years or older. Panel A shows the ownership of young and old 
CEOs, the difference is shown in the fifth column, and the p-value is stated in the sixth column. Panel B shows board and firm 
characteristics for young and old CEOs, the differences are shown in the fifth column and the p-values are stated in parentheses in 
the sixth column.  Table 1 defines the variables. The sample is Norwegian non-listed firms from 2000–2011 where revenue ≥ 2 
million NOK, board size ≥ 3, and the largest owner holds < 90% of the equity. Performance is censored at 2% and 98%, and 
leverage is censored at 99%.      
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5. Summary 
The findings in this thesis show that regulation, such as the gender balance law and the board 
independence code, results in unintended effects which may matter for the firm’s behavior. In 
the first essay, we find that stockholders of half the firms that suddenly become exposed to 
the gender balance law (GBL) choose the only alternative to changing the board that is to exit 
into an organizational form where the GBL does not apply.  
The second essay finds that the GBL causes a large increase in board independence. 
Involuntary increase in board independence is a potential problem because there is a trade-off 
between the board’s monitoring role and advice role. More independent directors are assumed 
to strengthen the board’s monitoring role, while more dependent directors are better advisors. 
Finally, we find that recommending a majority of independent directors in every firm by the 
independence code (IC) may hurt firms that are better off with a lower level of board 
independence. 
This thesis addresses economic consequences of new regulation of board composition. Our 
results show that profitable, young, and small firms are hurt the most by these regulations. 
That is, the cost of changing the board, either by increasing the fraction of female directors or 
by increasing the fraction of independent directors, is particularly costly for such firms. 
Recent political signals indicate that the exit option we analyze  may soon disappear. In 
particular, gender balance in corporate boards may be made mandatory not just for ASA firms, 
but also for some AS firms . If that happens, Norway will not just be special for being the first 
and only country to mandate a massive, rapid shift in the composition of corporate boards and 
to punish non-compliers with liquidation. The regulators may also decide to eliminate the 
option firms currently have to mitigate the costs of regulatory shocks by transforming into 
organizational forms that are not exposed to the law. Every other country considering gender 
balance regulation seems to favor the comply-or-explain system or considerably milder 
sanctions than liquidation. Such regulatory regimes would leave the gender balance choice to 
the firm’s discretion and hence allow for firm heterogeneity in board design. Our findings 
suggest that, compared to this more flexible alternative, the mandatory approach, and 
particularly one without exit options, is a costly way to regulate gender balance on corporate 
boards.  
Although the gender balance law is mandatory, the corporate governance code is not 
mandatory, but follows the principle of comply-or-explain. Nevertheless, there is a 
widespread view among policy makers that boards with at least half the directors being 
independent ensure good governance. Therefore, it is often argued that stockholders should 
ensure that their firm follows the code. Our evidence suggests that some firms are better off 
with a lower level of board independence. Hence, one-size-fits-all regulation is costly and 
should not be complied with by all firms. 
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